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Defendant/appellee Eugene Horbach ("Horbach") respectfully 
submits this brief in response to the Brief of plaintiff/appellant 
Lan C. England ("England"). 
JURISDICTION 
On November 14, 1994 the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
None of the arguments upon which England attempts to base his 
appeal were raised before the trial court. Therefore, in addition 
to the issues identified in England's Brief, this appeal also 
presents the issue of whether the Court of Appeals may reverse the 
trial court based upon arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
During trial, the trial court granted Horbach*s motion to 
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. That amendment, 
which England challenges in section VI. of his Brief, is governed 
not by Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but by Rule 
15(b), pursuant to which a trial court must allow amendment of the 
xRule 15(b) reads as follows: 
Amendments to conform to evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not 
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If 
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pleadings to include issues tried by the express or implied consent 
of the parties. (See discussion at pp. 19-21 below.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 23, 1991 England told Horbach that Horbach still owed 
$25,000 under a stock purchase agreement the parties had made in 
late 1989. This was incorrect. In the stock purchase agreement 
Horbach had agreed to purchase certain stock from England for 
$710,498.25, and by May 23, 1991 Horbach had already made payments 
totalling $855,000. Therefore, rather than owing $25,000, Horbach 
had overpaid by $144,501.75. However, because neither party had 
kept track of Horbach's payments, England mistakenly stated, and 
Horbach mistakenly believed, that $25,000 remained owing. 
Based on this mistake, Horbach agreed to give England an 
additional $25,000 and an interest in 2% of the stock,2 and England 
conveyed the stock to Horbach. Horbach paid the additional 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that 
it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the 
court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such 
evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b)(1994). 
The parties disputed the exact nature of this interest. 
England claimed that Horbach agreed to convey the 2% of the stock 
to England outright. By contrast, Horbach claimed he had merely 
granted a security interest in the 2% of the stock to secure 
payment of the additional $25,000 which he mistakenly believed he 
owed. This dispute regarding precisely what Horbach agreed to 
convey is, however, mooted by the trial court's holding that the 
agreement is unenforceable because it was based on a mutual mistake 
and was unsupported by consideration. 
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$25,000—making his total payment $880,000 and his over-payment 
$169,501.75. However, England initiated the action below in an 
attempt to force Horbach to also convey the 2% of the stock. 
At trial, England introduced into evidence Horbach's $880,000 
of payments, and conceded that as of May 23, 1991 Horbach had 
already paid the entire contractual stock purchase price of 
$710,498.25. Therefore, the trial court held that England was 
merely fulfilling a pre-existing contractual duty when he conveyed 
the stock to Horbach on May 23, 1991, and that no new consideration 
supported Horbach's agreement to give England another $25,000 or 
any interest in 2% of the stock. The trial court further held that 
the May 23, 1991 agreement was based on the parties' mutual mistake 
regarding the amount Horbach had paid. On these two bases--lack of 
consideration, and mutual mistake--the trial court held the 
agreement unenforceable, denied England's claim for the 2% of the 
stock, and granted Horbachfs counterclaim to recoup his $169,501.75 
overpayment. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The May 23rd Agreement 
In late 1989 England and Horbach entered into a stock purchase 
agreement whereby Horbach agreed to purchase from England 258,363 
shares of stock in Medicode, Inc. for $710,498.25. (Record (,fR.M) 
256, 488, 5313, 572). Beginning on December 29, 1989, Horbach made 
numerous payments to England, but failed to keep an accurate 
3Page 531 of the Record should be page 85 of the Trial 
Transcript. That page is missing from the official copy of the 
Record, and is therefore attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
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account of those payments. (R. 256, 576). By September 14, 1990 
Horbach had mistakenly paid a total of $855,000, which was 
$144,501.75 more than the contractual stock purchase price. (R. 
256, 257, 539-540). 
On May 23, 1991 the parties met to finalize the stock 
purchase. (R. 257, 505). England conceded at trial that as of May 
23, 1991 Horbach had already overpaid the agreed stock purchase 
price. (R. 539-540). However, England had also failed to keep an 
accurate account of the payments he had received; he testified at 
trial that on May 23, 1991 he believed he was still owed between 
$25,000 and $75,000. (R. 517). England further testified that 
during the May 23, 1991 meeting he told Horbach that an additional 
$25,000 was owed. (R. 517-518). 
At the May 23, 1991 meeting, Horbach mistakenly believed 
England's statement that he still owed $25,000 of the $710,498.25 
purchase price specified in the 1989 stock purchase agreement. (R. 
257, 577). Based on this mistake, Horbach agreed to pay England an 
additional $25,000 and to give England an interest in 2% of the 
Medicode stock, and England agreed to immediately convey his 
Medicode stock to Horbach (the "May 23rd Agreement"). (R. 257-258, 
506, 518, 577). 
Horbach subsequently paid England the additional $25,000. (R. 
258, 5124) . This payment brought Horbach's total payment to 
England to $880,000, which was $169,501.75 in excess of the 
4Page 512 of the Record should be page 66 of the Trial 
Transcript. That page is missing from the official copy of the 
Record, and is therefore attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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$710,498.25 contractual purchase price. (R. 258). Nevertheless, 
England demanded that Horbach also reconvey 2% of the Medicode 
stock. (R. 512). Horbach refused, and England filed his complaint 
initiating the action below on March 15, 1993. (R. 2-18). 
Horbach's Discovery Of His Overpayment Of England 
On December 14, 1993, Horbach informed the trial court that he 
had recently discovered evidence regarding his overpayment of 
England. Horbach moved the trial court for leave to amend his 
answer to include a counterclaim to recoup this overpayment.5 
Horbach also moved the trial court to continue the trial date and 
to allow further discovery into this overpayment issue.6 
England resisted the motion for a continuance, representing 
that he "is presently prepared to proceed to trial on this 
matter."7 England also opposed England's motion for leave to file 
a counterclaim on two grounds: (1) that "at the pretrial 
settlement conference, Horbach was authorized to file a Motion for 
Continuance but not a Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim," and 
(2) that "untimely motions to file counterclaims must be denied."8 
The trial court denied Horbach's motion on December 20, 1993. (R. 
199-200). Nevertheless, on February 4, 1994 England served 
5Motion For: Continuance Of Trial, Leave To File Counterclaim, 
And To Extend Discovery Period. (R. 184-189). 
6
 i d . 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Horbach's Motion for 
Continuance of Trial, Leave to File a Counterclaim, and to Extend 
Discovery Period at 2. (R. 193-198). 
8Id. at 4. 
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interrogatories on Horbach asking him to explain the basis of his 
proposed counterclaim that he had overpaid England. (R. 206-207; 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents to Defendant Eugene Horbach at 6 (attached hereto as 
Exhibit C) ) . 
The Trial Below 
This matter was tried to the court below on March 22, 1994. 
In Horbachfs Trial Memorandum, hand-delivered to England the 
morning of trial, Horbach argued that the pleadings should be 
amended to include a counterclaim for recoupment of his 
overpayment. (R. 228-230). Horbach's counsel then explicitly 
addressed the overpayment issue in his opening statement as 
follows: 
When we're through here, we're going to be seeking to ask 
the Court to modify the pleadings to conform to the 
evidence. We think that Mr. Horbach is due back about 
$350,000 that he's overpaid Mr. England, but that will 
come out when you see the evidence as it comes in. 
(R. 452-453). Furthermore, at the close of England's case in 
chief, Horbach's counsel moved for a directed verdict and stated 
that "the only issue left is what is the amount of the overpayment 
in terms of our ability to get it back from them." (R.565). 
At trial, England never opposed amending the pleadings; nor 
did he suggest that he was unprepared for, or would in any way be 
prejudiced by, the trial of Horbach's counterclaim. Rather, 
England's counsel acknowledged in his opening statement that 
"there's been a recent defense raised that Mr. England was way 
overpaid for the stock in the amount of about $200,000." (R. 450). 
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England's counsel and stated that in order to respond to the issue 
of overpayment, 
we will have to complicate the case a little bit and have 
Mr. England give background on that issue and he will do 
that in his testimony. 
(R. 450 (emphasis added)). England then himself put into evidence 
all of Horbach's $880,000 in payments which demonstrated the 
$169,501.75 overpayment. (R. 241, 539-540). England never 
objected to the introduction of evidence regarding Horbach's 
overpayment. Nor did he propose that his own evidence regarding 
Horbach's $880,000 in payments should be admitted only on the 
limited issue of whether Horbach had made payment in full, rather 
than the additional issue of whether Horbach had overpaid. 
At the close of evidence, Horbach's counsel formally moved to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence which had been adduced. (R. 
598). The trial court noted that he had taken note of Horbach's 
request in his Trial Memorandum to amend the pleadings to add a 
counterclaim for recoupment of the overpayment. (id.). England 
again failed to oppose Horbach's motion, or to make any objection 
to the requested amendment. 
The trial court found that as of May 23, 1991, Horbach had 
overpaid England by $144,501.75, but that the parties both 
mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained owing, and entered into 
the May 23rd Agreement on the basis of that mutual mistake. (R. 
257-258). The trial court further found that Horbach subsequently 
paid England an additional $25,000, bringing his total overpayment 
to 169,501.75. (R. 258). 
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Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that 
"[a]s of May 23, 1991, [Horbach] had fully performed his 
obligations under the 1989 stock purchase agreement," and that 
England therefore "was legally obligated to convey his 258,363 
shares of Medicode to" Horbach. (R. 258-259). The trial court 
concluded that when England agreed to immediately convey his stock 
to Horbach he was merely agreeing to perform "a preexisting duty," 
and that this did not provide any consideration to support the May 
23rd Agreement. (R. 259). The trial court also concluded that the 
May 23rd Agreement was unenforceable as a result of the parties1 
mutual mistake. (I^ d. ) • Finally, the trial court granted Horbach' s 
motion to amend the pleadings, and awarded Horbach judgment on his 
counterclaim for the amount of his overpayment. (R. 259-260, 442). 
At trial, England testified that he had made an agreement to 
perform certain services for Horbach, and that part of Horbach's 
payments to him were for those services rather than for the 
purchase of the Medicode stock. (R. 257). The trial court 
rejected England's testimony, holding that it was "not credible" on 
this point. (Id.). England also testified that it had been his 
"understanding" that the purchase price for the Medicode stock "was 
to be paid in two or three months." The trial court also rejected 
9England testified as follows: 
Q. What did Mr. Horbach say he was going to do in 
connection with the stock sale? 
A. He said that he would be purchasing my stock at 
$2.75 per share. 
Q. And what did you say? 
A. I agreed that that sounded fine and requested 
that it be done in short order and I expected that to be 
the first quarter. 
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this testimony, holding that although Horbach did not complete 
payment of the purchase price within two or three months, ,f[a]s of 
May 23, 1991, [Horbach] had fully performed his obligations under 
the 1989 stock purchase agreement." (R. 258-259).10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In sections I and II of his Brief, England attacks the trial 
court's holding that the May 23rd Agreement was unsupported by 
consideration. England argues that although he had a preexisting 
duty to convey the stock to Horbach, he sincerely (albeit 
mistakenly) believed that he did not, and that therefore his 
agreement to convey the stock constituted consideration. This 
argument fails for several reasons: (1) It ignores the trial 
court's alternative holding that the May 23rd Agreement is 
unenforceable on the basis of mutual mistake; (2) England's 
consideration argument is raised for the first time on appeal; and 
Q. Were any statements made about when that 
payment would be made, and if so, who made the 
statements? 
• • • 
A. I'm having trouble answering this because I'm 
just trying to give a straightforward answer. It was my 
recollection and it is my understanding that it was to be 
paid in two or three months. I don't know how else to 
answer that. 
(R. 490-491). 
1
 England characterizes his own testimony on this point as 
"undisputed." (E.g., England's Brief at 10-11). However, as the 
Utah Supreme Court has held, "[t]he testimony of a party or other 
interested witness is not conclusive, even if it is not 
contradicted." Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 P.2d 
101, 104 (Utah 1978). 
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(3) surrender of an utterly baseless claim, even if sincerely 
believed, does not constitute consideration. 
In section III of his Brief, England argues that even if the 
May 23, 1991 agreement is unsupported by consideration, it may be 
enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This argument 
fails for the following reasons: (1) It too is raised for the 
first time on appeal; (2) England's performance of a preexisting 
contractual duty does not constitute detrimental reliance; and (3) 
Horbach's mistake regarding his payments to England precludes him 
from being promissorily estopped. 
Finally, in section IV of his Brief, England asserts that the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting Horbach's motion to 
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence adduced at trial. 
England's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) England 
failed to assert any of the bases of this argument before the trial 
court; and (2) the overpayment issue was tried with England's 
implied assent, and the trial court therefore had no discretion in 
allowing an amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
When the decision of a trial court is reviewed on appeal, the 
Utah Court of Appeals will "presume [the decision] to be correct 
and search for grounds upon which [it] may be upheld." Allen v. 
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 
1992). Therefore, the Court of Appeals will affirm "a trial 
court's decision whenever [it] can do so on a proper ground, even 
though it was not the ground on which the trial court relied in its 
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ruling." Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 
P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984). By contrast, the Court of Appeals 
will not reverse a trial court based upon "an issue raised for the 
first time on appeal." Wurst v. Department of Employment Sec, 818 
P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991); see also John Deere Co. v. A & H 
Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1994) (appellant who 
"did not properly raise [an] issue at the trial court below" is 
"precluded from arguing it on appeal"). 
England asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the trial 
court on the basis of three legal arguments. However, England 
failed to raise any of those arguments before the trial court. 
Moreover, England's arguments are all legally untenable. The trial 
court's judgment must therefore be affirmed. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE MAY 23rd AGREEMENT IS 
UNENFORCEABLE 
The trial court gave two alternative bases for its holding 
that the May 23rd Agreement is unenforceable. First, because 
Horbach had already "fully performed his obligations under the 1989 
stock purchase agreement" England was "legally obligated to convey 
his 258,363 shares of Medicode stock to" Horbach, and England's 
performance of such a "preexisting duty does not provide 
consideration for a valid contract." (R. 258-259). Second, the 
May 23rd Agreement was unenforceable because it was executed under 
the parties' mutually mistaken belief that $25,000 remained owing 
under the original stock purchase agreement. (R. 257, 259). 
England challenges the first basis of the trial court's 
judgment—lack of consideration—in sections I and II of his Brief. 
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However, he simply ignores the second basis of the judgment--mutual 
mistake. The trial court must therefore be affirmed regardless of 
whether England's consideration argument might have any merit. 
Moreover, as discussed below, England's argument is legally 
fallacious. 
A. The Judgment Of The Trial Court Must Be Sustained On The 
Ground Of The Parties' Mutual Mistake. 
As noted above, the trial court's holding regarding the 
parties' mutual mistake provides an independently sufficient basis 
for the conclusion that the May 23rd Agreement is unenforceable. 
Nevertheless, England challenges neither the factual determination 
that the May 2 3rd Agreement was entered into on the basis of a 
mutual mistake,11 nor the legal proposition that such a mistake 
renders the agreement unenforceable. See Neiderhauser Builders and 
Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah App. 1992) 
(purported accord and satisfaction unenforceable if it was executed 
under a unilateral or mutual mistake). The judgment of the trial 
court must therefore be affirmed on the ground of mutual mistake, 
regardless of England's argument regarding consideration. 
B. England Demonstrates No Error In The Trial Court's 
Judgment That The May 23rd Agreement Is Unsupported By 
Consideration. 
Although England purports to challenge the trial court's 
judgment that no consideration supported the May 23rd Agreement, he 
does not dispute the premises of that judgment—that Horbach had 
already performed all of his contractual duties, and that England 
xlThe evidence introduced at trial not only supports the trial 
court's finding, but is undisputed on this point. (R. 532). 
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therefore had a preexisting duty to convey the stock. (R. 258-
259).x England thus concedes, as he must, that on May 23, 1991 
he had no legitimate basis for refusing to convey the stock to 
Horbach. 
Nevertheless, England bases his appeal upon a new legal 
proposition: that consideration "may consist of a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute which is not necessarily well-founded but is in 
good faith." (England's Brief at 12 (quoting In re Grimm, 784 P. 2d 
1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989)). England attempts to bring himself 
within this proposition by asserting that he believed that he was 
entitled to withhold the stock, and although this belief was 
mistaken, it was nonetheless "bona fide." (England's Brief at 11). 
This argument fails for a number of reasons discussed below. 
1. England may not seek to have the trial court 
reversed with a consideration argument raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
England's present argument—that his sincere but mistaken 
belief that he was not legally obligated to convey the stock to 
Horbach makes his agreement to do so sufficient consideration to 
support the May 23rd Agreement--was never raised before the trial 
court. The judgment of the trial court may not be reversed on the 
England conceded at trial that by May 23, 1991 Horbach had 
already paid him more than the contractual stock purchase price, 
(R. 539-540), and he does not dispute this fact on appeal. 
(England's Brief at 12 n.3). Moreover, although he claims to have 
believed "that he had no obligation to turn the stock over to" 
Horbach, he concedes that this "belief was wrong." (England's 
Brief at 11). 
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basis of such an argument raised for the first time on appeal. 
Wurst, 818 P.2d at 1039; John Deere, 876 P.2d at 888.13 
2. There was no "dispute" at the May 23rd meeting, 
only a mutual mistake. 
Furthermore, the proposition on which England attempts to 
rely--that the "compromise of a bona fide dispute" may provide 
consideration—is simply inapposite to the facts of this case as 
proven at trial. No evidence of any "dispute" was ever introduced. 
Rather, England testified that he told Horbach that $25,000 
remained owing, and Horbach testified that he believed this 
representation. (R. 517-518, 577). Here there was no "dispute," 
bona fide or otherwise, and England's consideration argument is 
therefore inapplicable. Instead, there was only a mutual mistake, 
and as discussed above, this provides an independent basis for the 
trial court's holding that the May 23rd Agreement was 
unenforceable. 
3. The compromise of a wholly baseless position cannot 
constitute consideration. 
Finally, the proposition upon which England attempts to rely-
that the "compromise of a bona fide dispute which is not 
necessarily well-founded" constitutes consideration--is 
inapplicable to the "compromise" of a position as utterly baseless 
as was England's. By May 23, 1991, Horbach had already paid 
England $855,000, which was $144,501.75 more than the $710,498.25 
13Because this argument was not raised below, the purported 
sincerity of England's belief was never a material issue at trial, 
and therefore, was never challenged. This highlights the policy 
reasons for requiring a party such as England to raise all such 
arguments before the trial court. 
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purchase price. (R. 257). Therefore, England's supposed "belief1 
that he was still owed $25,000 was completely baseless, and 
depended upon his continuing failure to simply add up the payments 
he had received from Horbach. 
None of the cases which England cites found an enforceable 
accord and satisfaction where such a meritless position had been 
compromised. Rather, in In re Grimm, 784 P. 2d 1238 (Utah App. 
1989), this Court enforced an accord and satisfaction because it 
was supported by the compromise of "a legitimate controversy as to 
what assets" were subject to a trust. 784 P.2d at 1244. Likewise, 
in Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985), an 
accord and satisfaction was enforced because it was supported by 
the compromise of an apparently meritorious dispute over the 
quality of the performance of a contract. 699 P.2d at 731, 733.14 
Four of the other cases cited by England actually undercut 
his position. Thus, in Ashton v. Skeen, 39 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah 
1935), the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce a purported accord 
and satisfaction because no valid position had been compromised; 
the court did not address whether or not the appellant had a good 
faith belief in that position. In Neiderhauser Builders v. 
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah App. 1992), this Court held 
that "[w]hen there is a unilateral mistake, and a party accepts 
less than it is entitled to, the theory of accord and satisfaction 
will not prevent the mistaken party's recovery of the actual, 
correct amount." Suqarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1369, 1372 (Utah 1980), holds that where "the underlying claim is 
liquidated and certain as to amount, separate consideration must be 
found to support the accord; otherwise, the obligor binds himself 
to do nothing he was not already obligated to do, and the obligee's 
promise to accept a substitute performance is unenforceable." In 
Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. 
App. 1982), the Kansas court held that M[a]nY forbearance to 
prosecute or defend a claim or action . . . is usually a sufficient 
consideration for a contract based thereon, unless the claim or 
defense is obviously invalid, worthless or frivolous." (Emphasis 
added). 
The remainder of England's cases are simply inapposite. 
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Therefore, these cases stand only for the proposition that a 
claim need not necessarily be a "winner" in order for the 
compromise of that claim to provide consideration supporting an 
accord and satisfaction. They do not support England's argument 
that consideration can be found in the "compromise" of a completely 
baseless claim. Rather, as noted in 15A C.J.S. § 11(d) (1967) at 
211, 
A mere belief on the part of a claimant that he has a 
claim, without any facts on which such belief may be 
founded, is not sufficient. . . . Good faith alone . . . 
has been held insufficient to support a compromise where 
the claim surrendered is wholly without foundation and 
not a doubtful one. 
Therefore, even if England had raised this argument before the 
trial court, and even if there had been a "dispute" capable of 
being compromised, his purported belief that he was still owed 
$25,000 was not merely not "well-founded," but was utterly devoid 
of foundation. England's "compromise" of this belief provides no 
consideration to support any accord and satisfaction. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court that the 
May 23rd Agreement is unenforceable must be affirmed. 
II. THIS COURT MAY NOT REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE 
MAY 23RD AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE ON THE BASIS OF ENGLAND'S 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT 
In section III of his Brief, England argues that even if the 
May 23rd Agreement is unsupported by consideration, it should 
nevertheless be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
This argument fails for several reasons discussed below. 
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A. England May Not Seek To Have The Trial Court Reversed 
With A Promissory Estoppel Argument Raised For The First 
Time On Appeal. 
England's promissory estoppel argument was never raised before 
the trial court, but is asserted for the first time on this appeal. 
Therefore, he may not ask this Court to reverse the judgment of the 
trial court on the basis of that argument. Wurst, 818 P.2d at 
1039; John Deere, 876 P.2d at 888. 
B. England Cannot Demonstrate Any Detrimental Reliance. 
England concedes that detrimental reliance is an essential 
element of promissory estoppel, but argues that this element is 
satisfied by his agreement to convey the stock to Horbach on May 
23, 1991. (England's Brief at 15-16). However, as the trial court 
concluded, England had a preexisting legal duty to convey the stock 
to Horbach. (R. 258-259). As a matter of law, the performance of 
such a preexisting duty cannot constitute detrimental reliance for 
the sake of a promissory estoppel claim. 80 Nassau Associates v. 
Crossland Federal Savings Bank, 169 B.R. 832, 842 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1994) ('fA party cannot assert estoppel, however, as a result of 
being 'induced1 to do what he is already legally required to do."); 
In re Marriage of Neiss, 743 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Mont. 1987) (denying 
promissory estoppel claim where party has not done substantially 
more than he was already legally obligated to do) . Therefore, even 
if England's promissory estoppel theory were properly before this 
Court, the judgment of the trial court could not be reversed on 
that theory. 
30707 17 
C. Horbach's Mistaken Belief That He Still Owed England 
$25/000 Precludes Promissory Estoppel. 
Finally, the case on which England relies for the essential 
elements of promissory estoppel, Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993), provides that one of M[t]he 
factual prerequisites for promissory estoppel" is "that the 
defendants were aware of all the material facts." 848 P.2d at 175 
(quoting Tolboe Constr. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 
843, 845 (Utah 1984)). As the trial court found, on May 23, 1991 
Horbach mistakenly believed that he still owed England $25,000, 
when in fact he had already overpaid by $144,501.75. (R. 257). 
Therefore, Horbach was clearly not "aware of all the material 
facts," and promissory estoppel is inapplicable. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HORBACH'S MOTION TO AMEND THE 
PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL 
A. England Made No Objection To Horbach's Rule 15(b) Motion 
Before The Trial Court, And May Not Do So For The First 
Time On Appeal. 
In his Trial Memorandum, Horbach argued that he was entitled 
to restitution of his overpayment, and that the pleadings should be 
amended to include such a counterclaim. (R. 228-230). In his 
opening statement, Horbach's counsel stated that he intended to 
prove that England had been overpaid, and that he would ask the 
trial court to amend the pleadings to include Horbach's claim for 
the restitution of this overpayment. (R. 452-453). Then, in his 
motion for a directed verdict at the close of England's case, 
Horbach's counsel stated that "the only issue left is what is the 
amount of the overpayment in terms of our ability to get it back 
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from them." (R. 565). Finally, after the close of evidence, 
Horbach's counsel made a formal motion to have the pleadings 
conformed to the evidence. (R. 598). The trial court granted 
Horbach's motion, and gave him judgment on his counterclaim against 
England. 
In section IV. of his Brief, England argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it granted Horbach's motion to 
amend. However, at no time during trial did England suggest any 
opposition to Horbach's motion to amend. Rather, all of England's 
arguments that granting the motion was unfairly prejudicial are 
raised for the first time on this appeal. Having failed to 
oppose England's motion to amend before the trial court, England 
may not raise this issue on appeal. Wurst, 818 P.2d at 1039; John 
Deere, 876 P.2d at 888. 
B. Because The Overpayment Issue Was Tried By Consent It 
Would Have Been Error For The Trial Court Not To Grant 
Horbach's Motion For Leave To Amend. 
Not only did England fail to object to Horbach's motion to 
amend, but he also made no objection to the presentation of the 
150n December 14, 1993, Horbach had made a motion pursuant to 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to add a 
counterclaim for restitution of the overpayment. (R. 184-189). 
England opposed that motion on procedural grounds; he did not raise 
any of the arguments regarding prejudice which now appear in his 
Brief. (R. 193-198). 
Although the trial court denied Horbach's Rule 15(a) motion, 
"a court's refusal to permit an amendment before trial under Rule 
15(a) will not prevent the same amendment from being made under 
Rule 15(b) if the issue subsequently is tried with the consent of 
the parties." 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary K. 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493 (1990) at 51. 
Horbach's motion to amend at trial was governed by Rule 15(b), and 
as discussed in the text above, was wholly unopposed by England. 
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overpayment issue at trial. As discussed above, Horbach clearly 
announced his intention to try the overpayment issue. Rather than 
object that he was unprepared for or would be prejudiced by the 
trial of this issue, England's counsel acknowledged that the issue 
had been raised and stated that he would respond to it. (R. 450). 
Then England himself introduced all of the evidence demonstrating 
that he had been overpaid by $169,501.75. England never suggested 
that this evidence should be admitted only as relevant to whether 
Horbach had paid in full, as opposed to whether Horbach had 
overpaid. 
Because England never objected to trial of the overpayment 
issue, and because he himself introduced the evidence supporting 
Horbach's overpayment counterclaim, England implicitly consented to 
the trial of this issue. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976) ("Implied consent may 
be found where one party raises an issue material to the other 
party's case, or where evidence is introduced without objection.11) . 
Where as here an issue is tried "by the express or implied consent 
of the parties," Rule 15(b) makes it "mandatory for the trial court 
to grant leave to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence." 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktq., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 509 
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(Utah App. 1988).16 Thus, it would have been reversible error for 
the trial court to have denied Horbach's motion to amend.17 
On pages 20 through 22 of his Brief, England attempts to 
excuse his failure to object by arguing that he remained unaware 
throughout the trial that Horbach intended to counterclaim for 
restitution of the overpayment. This argument is ludicrous. As 
discussed above, Horbach repeatedly and explicitly announced his 
intention to try the overpayment issue and to counterclaim for the 
recoupment of that overpayment. England therefore cannot possibly 
have remained ignorant that Horbach intended to counterclaim, and 
that the overpayment issue was being tried. By failing to object, 
England implicitly consented to the trial of this issue, and his 
attempt to challenge the trial court's grant of Horbach's motion to 
18 
amend is legally and factually baseless. 
165ee also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227, 1229 
(Utah 1984) (where issue not raised in the pleadings had been tried 
with the parties' implicit consent, "Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) dictates 
that the issue should be treated as if it had been raised in the 
pleadings"); Carnicero, 545 P.2d at 506 ("[T]he first part of Rule 
15(b) is not permissive in terms, for it provides that issues tried 
by express or implied consent shall be treated as if raised in the 
pleadings."). 
17Because the granting of a motion to amend under the first 
part of Rule 15(b) is not discretionary, England's argument must be 
rejected without ever reaching the abuse of discretion issue. 
However, even assuming this issue were presented, on the facts of 
this case there cannot possibly have been an abuse of discretion: 
England had opposed further discovery regarding the overpayment 
issue (R. 193-198), represented to the trial court that he was 
ready to try this issue (R. 194, 450), and then himself introduced 
the evidence showing overpayment. 
18England cites a number of cases as purported support for his 
attack on the trial court's grant of leave to amend. However, all 
of those merely upheld trial courts' exercise of discretion in 
denying motions to amend. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 
30707 21 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, England's appeal must be 
denied, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 1995 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Steven E. McCowin 
Wesley D. Felix 
First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
Steven L. Taylor 
124 South 600 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
By: 
Attorneys for DefendarTt/Appellee 
(Utah App. 1988) ("we cannot say the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Chadwick's motion to amend her complaint"); 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) ("the court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the 
complaint"); Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988, 989-90 
(Utah 1982) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion to amend."); Trafton v. Younqblood, 442 
P.2d 648, 658 (Cal. 1968) ("the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting the amendment"). England fails to cite any 
case in which a trial court was held to have abused its discretion 
by granting such a motion. 
On page 21 of his Brief, England represents that Trafton is 
"strikingly similar" to the instant case. However, as noted above, 
Trafton merely affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to 
amend. Moreover, the motion to amend in Trafton was not made at 
trial, but only after the filing of the trial court's memorandum of 
decision. 442 P. 2d at 657. Further, the amendment would have 
added an issue which "by the explicit agreement of the parties, was 
not before the court," and which the moving party had "renounced." 
442 P.2d at 658. 
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60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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WES FELIX 
136 South Main, #500 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
521-8900 
ANNA M. BENNETT, C.S.R. 
License No. 220 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 535-5203 
Mr. Horbach, would you have any argument that it's different, 
or would you contend it's different than the 809,599.35? 
A No, that would be correct. 
Q Okay. Now, I'm going to assume for a second for 
purpose of the question, I want to do the stock shares in 
evidence and it's 258,363, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q The 2.75 a share, that was the agreed price? 
A Correct. 
Q So that equals $710,498.25? 
A Correct. 
Q And that's what you had coming for those shares of 
stock, isn't it? That's what you agreed to sell them for in 
any event? 
A Yes, in the initial agreement. 
Q Okay. Now, if in fact the 64,000 or any part of it 
and the 50,000 — well, let me break it out here. 
Let's assume that both of those are not included 
for a minute. 
A Okay. 
Q Exclude both of them, which is essentially what 
you've done on your chart, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q That would mean as of May 1981, you had been paid 
$695,000. Would you quarrel with that? 
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vs. 
TRIAL 
Civil No. CIV 930901471 CV 
EUGENE HORBACH, MEDICODE 
INCORPORATED, 
Defendant. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
on Tuesday, March 22, 1994 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant 
Horbach: 
SAMUEL D. McVEY 
RANDY AUSTIN 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
328-3600 
STEPHEN G. CROCKETT 
WES FELIX 
136 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And actually, there are four checks beginning on 
page 25 and continuing through page 28; is that correct? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Is it your understanding that those were the checks 
that were paid to you to make up this $25,000 bounced check? 
A Yes. 
Q And the last payment is reflected on a check dated 
2-17-92; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, on the back of that check which is on page 28 
of Exhibit P-l, there appear to be some handwritten words, 
"Final payment for stock purchase." 
A Yes. 
Q Did you write those in? 
A No, I did not. Mr. Horbach did. 
Q At some point did you request that Mr. Horbach 
deliver to you the two percent of the stock that's reflected 
in the note, the handwritten note from the May meeting? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Do you recall when that was? 
A It's the December — was it 1992? I think the 
exhibits have been — 
Q Well, let me provide you with what's been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-6. I'd ask you if you recognize 
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Randy T. Austin (A6171) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, an 
individual, MEDICODE, 
INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, and DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANT 
EUGENE HORBACH 
Civil No. 930901471CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff Lan C. England propounds the following discovery requests to 
defendant Eugene Horbach. These discovery requests are to be answered pursuant to 
Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Each request is continuing in 
-1-
EXHIBIT "C" 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify the complete basis for your 
contention that you may have overpaid Lan England in connection with your purchase of 
England's Medicode stock. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please identify the complete basis for the 
Fourth Defense in your Answer to the Complaint that the "substitute agreement" should 
be dismissed because it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify the complete basis for your 
claim that the "substitute agreement" was not supported by consideration. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please identify any and all litigation with 
which you were involved as of December 1, 1993, to the present, whether as a witness, a 
party or otherwise. Specify the court in which the case was or is pending, the name of the 
case, the case number, the judge presiding over the case, and the basic nature of the case. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify all documents, including but 
not limited to, minutes of corporate meetings, corporate records or memoranda, which 
reflect or discuss in any way the transfer of Medicode stock from Lan England to you or 
your agreement to hold stock in trust for Lan England. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify all persons involved in any 
internal review of your records to determine what consideration had been paid Lan 
England for shares of Medicode stock which you purchased. 
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